Abstract. This paper presents a case study of the implementation of a sophisticated internal performance monitoring system by the service division of a valueadded reseller of Canon products in Denmark. This new control system could not only aid in controlling cost and productivity but could also monitor customer service and quality levels. Although the new system was implemented with exceptional technical success, it met a very defensive reception among the technicians. In response, management decided to initiate an empowerment programme. In order for this programme to have a significant impact, management needed to make the requisite shifts from a strictly hierarchical to a team-based organization form, as well as moving from a hierarchical to an interactive control process. It was only after the company completed this type of`organizational realignment' that the real benefits of the system were harvested. This case study explores the implications of the dispersed and empowered organization and the consequent lack of direct process control. In order to fulfil this aim, the discussion is based on the Grossman, Hart and Moore theories of incomplete contracting and the role of`information assets' and incentive misalignment of the newly`empowered' and highly knowledge-based service organization. Although property rights theories have typically been applied in`boundary of the firm' questions, the goal of this case study is to illustrate the potential of incomplete contract theory in explaining internal incentive structures and governance mechanisms in the emerging wave of organizations characterized by a rich knowledge base, geographical dispersion, or even`loose' and virtual organization structures.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
It can be fairly argued that the dominant stream of research concerned with the relationship between information technology and organizations is thoroughly indebted to the seminal work of Leavitt & Whisler (1958) . Yet in recent decades a parallel tradition has emerged potentially offering alternative explanations for the current changes in organizational structure. These are the economic theories, especially agency theory (Ross, 1973) , transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1985 , and the theory of incomplete contracting (GHM) (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) . This paper is firmly rooted in the latter tradition. However, while these economic schools have typically focused upon questions of vertical and lateral integration (e.g. boundary of the firm), this case study will utilize incomplete contracting theory as an explanatory framework exclusively for internal incentive structures within a single organization. As this type of application is relatively new, the paper begins with a brief overview of the emergence of incomplete contracting as a model of organizational structure and internal governance mechanisms.
Incomplete contracting
The theory of incomplete contracting has its origins in transaction cost economics and was first pioneered by Grossman, Hart and Moore (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) . In recent years incomplete contracting theory has obtained the same attention as transaction cost theory as a valid explanatory framework of vertical and lateral integration (Kreps, 1996) . Moreover, information systems scholars have successfully applied the theory in the study of interorganizational systems and electronic intermediaries (Bakos & Brynjolfsson, 1993; Bakos & Nault, 1997) .
Like TCE, incomplete contract theory views the transaction as the fundamental unit of analysis. However, a critical difference is the assumption that economic actors cannot, and do not, foresee and contract for every contingency. In other words, all`real-world' contracts will somehow be incomplete, in that it is either impossible or too expensive to foresee, define, enumerate and contract upon all circumstances and contingencies which may occur in the future. Accordingly, all rights not expressly defined in the contract accrue to the owner of thè asset' as`residual rights' of ownership. The allocation of these residual rights will have a pivotal effect on the bargaining position of the parties after investing in the contract/relationship. Based upon these roughly described principles, Grossman, Hart and Moore have developed a theory of vertical and lateral integration and market structures. access organizations via the perspective of residual rights of ownership of the`information asset'.
What actually constitutes a`knowledge' or`information-based' asset is a very problematic issue. The definition of`increasing the agent's marginal value' encompasses a broad spectrum of possibilities Ð from data, to information, to skill Ð all of which are contingent upon agent and context. In this essay we concern ourselves with what we may call`knowledge of experience' or knowledge of the`particular circumstances of time and place ' (Hayek, 1945, p. 524 ). Here we mean the specific, idiosyncratic knowledge which is typically the byproduct of the production of a particular good or service, be it skills, knowledge of customers, preferences, machines, unemployed resources, etc.
When knowledge is requisite in decision making, it follows that there are clear benefits in colocating decision authority with the knowledge that is valuable in making those decisions. There are two immediate options when attempting to co-locate knowledge and decision rights. One is moving the knowledge to those who make decisions; the other is moving the decision rights to those who have the knowledge (Jensen & Meckling, 1992 ). Yet the predominant paradigm in organizations, owing to issues such as efficiency and accountability, is the centralization of decision-making authority. As a consequence, management information systems are implemented to aggregate the knowledge and transfer it to those who maintain the decision rights.
The important question is not whether such knowledge can be transferred, but what the relative costs and benefits of doing so are. Idiosyncratic, context-specific knowledge is almost by definition difficult to aggregate and transfer without a significant loss of depth, texture and context (Szulanski, 1996) . In other words, one may get`data' at the cost of`knowledge'. But often an even more significant transfer cost is time. Although technology has almost eliminated temporal problems in electronic transfer, effective transfer from the source to the decision maker remains as problematic today as it has for previous millennia. As such, human interdependencies pose a continued challenge to accuracy, judgement and delays. Stated intuitively, it takes time for people to absorb information (Jensen & Meckling, 1992) . Therefore we emphasize the difference between transferring data electronically and effectively transferring knowledge, such that people are equipped to act upon it.
Agency and hold-up costs
The increased focus on quick response times seen in many organizations today highlights the feasibility of the second option: transferring decision rights to those who have the knowledge. Yet this option poses a familiar problem: the threat of agency costs. And while the challenge of mitigating agency costs has received significant attention within the ownership and control of physical assets, less attention in economics and management has been given to the issue of knowledge or information-based assets. We therefore refer to work which has applied the concept of`property rights and knowledge base assets' to explicate internal governance mechanisms of organizations. Specifically, Brynjolfsson (1994) has taken the GHM framework and explicitly modelled the consequences of idiosyncratic`knowledge assets' with high transfer costs (i.e. inalienable). In traditional property rights frameworks, the key to understanding who maintains the final, definitive control of an economic relationship lies in the residual ownership rights of the`assets'. However, this picture can become convoluted when we delineate between physical and`information-based' assets, as disparate ownership of physical and information assets is becoming a common reality for many emerging organization forms. This can lead not only to agency costs but also to`hold-up' costs familiar from the Williamsonian vocabulary, where specific knowledge may be required to operate a given physical asset (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1985 .
An appealing characteristic of incomplete contracting theory is that, given contractual incompleteness, governance structures based upon softer, unverifiable information and implicit self-enforcing mechanisms become critical. When contingencies occur that are not explicitly contracted for, other mechanisms, such as corporate image, reputation, trust and social norms, should be considered as determinant factors in corporate and organizational behaviour (Gietzmann, 1996) . Therefore, what is interesting in this specific derivative of GHM are not only the classic incentive and hold-up problems which arise but also the`social technology' and organizational design which become relevant in mitigating agency costs in contractually incomplete settings.
The paper proceeds by presenting the case of Bruhn A/S. The case is followed by an interpretative analysis, where the value of incomplete contracting as a framework of internal organizational governance is illustrated. Specifically, the separation of physical and information assets and the consequent incentive misalignment are examined. A discussion of the compensating measures that were needed in order to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour, as well as the corresponding benefits in information coordination, follows.
B R U H N A / S Data collection
This case study commenced in the spring of 1996 and was completed in the spring of 1997. In total, 19 semistructured data collection and verification interviews were completed with the company's senior and functional management, as well as line employees (technicians) and technician team leaders. This study was funded by, and completed in accordance with, CEBUSNET, which focuses upon the analysis of business best practice as a function of institutional and market environments, as well as a combination of enabling factors such as information technology, organization forms and human resource principles (Seibt et al., 1997) .
Company background
Bruhn A/S has achieved an exceptional track record as a value-added reseller and distributor of Canon products in Denmark. The company, privately owned by the Bruhn family, has specialized in providing a very high level of service and operating security across the complete range of Canon printers and photocopiers. Through an exclusive agreement with Canon, head-quartered in Japan, Bruhn has focused on two main strategic areas: sales and long-term service contracts. An average annual revenue of & 800 million DKK (& 105 million ECU) is split evenly between sales and service activities. Of the 550-plus employees in Bruhn, over 150 service technicians continually provide service throughout the country.
Bruhn's managerial policies are to a significant degree a response to the competitive demands of its marketplace. Firstly, the market's feverish price pressure on new products places constant demands for productivity improvements. As a working rule, the management states that`productivity increases in year one are profit in year two'. A second focal point for the management is`adaptability'. Owing to the turbulence in their market, management believes that the only thing they can be certain about in the coming years is the need to adapt and change. Therefore, increasing the general adaptability of its workforce is a constant objective for Bruhn.
Market characteristics
In the Danish market for document reproduction, Bruhn shares leadership with Xerox at roughly 22% of the market. In recent years, however, the company has been forced to realize that technical excellence in products is becoming less and less potent as a competitive enabler and differentiator. This ensuing commoditization, combined with excess capacity in both professional and retail sales channels, has resulted in acute price pressure and falling contribution level. Consequently, value-adding service contracts have overtaken sales as the primary source of the company's operating profits.
The service process
The service level, or variety of specific services the customer receives, is dependent upon the particular profile specified in the customer's contractual agreement. Examples of services include:
l Rapid Dispatch: a service technician is on-site within 4 hours' notice for major machines and 6 hours' notice for peripheral products.
l Quick Response: a technician contacts the customer within 1 hour of original communication to either help the customer via telephone or agree upon a specific time for the service call.
l Ambulance Service: a special express service where the technician is on-site within 2 hours. l Stand-by Service Watch: for extremely large production runs, a technician can be reserved for standby status.
l Help Desk: a telephone hotline for immediate advice on technical problems. l Systems Support: consulting services for computer networks and printers.
When the day begins, only 50% of the jobs are known. During the day, customers call the service department where the operator logs the customer's information into the planning system. The system prioritizes and delegates the assignments to the individual technician. Once the technician has completed the job, all details are reported back to central dispatch concerning parts usage and inventory, and services completed, as well as key figures of the specific machine and customer.
The information technology (IT) system is centred on a DEC Alpha mainframe running an RDB/Oracle relational database. Operations of the central system are outsourced to an IBM division specializing in facility management. The service department's main system supports job dispatching/planning, spare part logistics, and the overall optimization of the service function. Particularly noteworthy is that the job planning system utilizes optimization algorithms to model both hard financial parameters such as geographical distance, time and contractual profiles and soft`customer service' factors. Because all service contracts specify a maximum time for technician response, the system attempts to answer the question`What is the relative cost of coming one hour later than promised?'. All analytical applications are based in SAS as a front-end analysis tool based on de-central data warehouses.
Business performance monitoring
To support the service function, as well as facilitate the productivity improvements necessitated by the marketplace, Bruhn decided that a focused system was needed to increase the visibility of both efficiency and customer service levels. In January 1994, Bruhn established a performance monitoring system (Fig. 1) which monitors both typical productivity as well as service efficiency measures. A brief definition of the measures follows:
l Time productivity is a simple ratio of the total time the technician has registered on the clock divided by the net time registered, either on service calls or in transport. The purpose of this statistic is to measure the amount of time the technician spends in direct, productive activities.
l Job productivity measures the average amount of time used for an assignment in a given period. Is the technician faster or slower on average in completing a service call, when compared with the norm?
l Service efficiency registers the average amount of time from the point where the technician has made a service call to the time when he/she has been called back to the specific machine again. The intent here is to begin to assess the quality of the work completed by the technician. Time productivity measurements are quickly deemed superfluous, both in financial costs and in customer satisfaction, if the technician does not adequately service the machine and must return.
l Spare parts indicates the number of jobs the technician has completed on-site without having to attain additional spare parts. The measurement is designed to support the monitoring of the physical logistics system, as well as customer satisfaction.
l Recall percentage registers the number of jobs recalled within three days of the original visit. This is also an attempt to monitor the quality of the service provided by the technician. If the customer reports that the problem occurs within three days of the first visit, it is an indication that the original problem has not been adequately solved, or that the technician has not thoroughly checked the machine for other potential problems. l Jobs below max time reports the number of jobs completed below the maximum allowed norm time, which is specified in the service contract. This is an attempt to measure the productivity of the service function. It also provides an indirect indication of customer satisfaction.
l Average response time measures the average time it takes for the technician to arrive on-site after the customer has reported the job to Bruhn. This statistic is a moderate measure of productivity and a direct indicator of customer satisfaction.
Organization: barriers and challenges
Preliminary deployment of the business performance monitoring (BPM) system met a cold and defensive reception among the service technicians when applied on the individual level. Not only did the technicians have problems understanding the BPM's language, but the organizational context within which management chose to launch the project was structurally unripe for the initiative.
The existing context
We can best understand this by looking at what the BPM system replaced. The previous reporting system consisted of a simple monthly report containing individual statistics of total jobs completed, a simple categorization of service type, as well as a standard monetary value of the inventory usage for the period. In terms of accountability, a traditional hierarchical reporting structure ensured that the technicians performed within the appropriate general levels, but no specific or individual performance goals were formulated or enforced. The middle managers maintained a general feeling for where the technicians' performance should be.
This fairly liberal`accountability structure' was agitated by the fact that the nature of the service technician's job requires that they are in the field servicing customers the vast majority of the time. The technicians do not even have to visit Bruhn to replenish spare parts, as inventory management is subcontracted to a third party, who replenishes the individual inventories in the service vans at the home of the technician. While entirely logical from an accounting and logistics viewpoint, the unfortunate effect of this geographical dispersion is that many technicians develop a higher degree of loyalty towards their customers, whom they see on a regular basis, than they do towards the company, where they only meet twice a month. This is a natural human reaction, but one having markedly adverse effects on key areas of employee performance and satisfaction.
These unfavourable circumstances compounded the frustrations the technicians felt with the BPM system. Tensions with the system tended to group around several problematic areas:
2 Secondly, the position of service technician demands people who are detail oriented by nature. It was therefore natural for the technicians to become highly focused upon less significant details, at the expense of a more holistic understanding of the larger patterns. 3 Finally, the question of how to use the measurements in a constructive manner remained largely unanswered.
The system provided an excellent mechanism for telling the technicians how, where and when they were performing inadequately. However, a pedagogic medium for coaching the technicians into improved performance using BPM had not been provided by Bruhn management, which had failed to realize the obstructive,`big brother' effect of the system. As one technician cited sarcastically:
The BPM told us how many times we breathe and how many steps we take, but we still did things the same way.' [Technician] In direct confrontation with management, the technicians would assume a very defensive and often aggressive posture. Management concluded that most of the technicians objected strongly to the intrusion into their autonomy and seriously questioned the validity of the measurements. The challenge was to ascertain to what degree the problems arose from the fact that the technicians were simply unaccustomed to being measured, opposed to what degree the intrinsic nature of the`system' itself produced the negative response. Productivity and customer service are very difficult to improve if no attempt is made to measure them. The question was how to register and control them constructively.
Human resources: the empowered response
As a consequence, Bruhn decided to keep the BPM as it was and focus on the organizational structure where the system was applied. The company's management chose to launch an empowerment programme. And while the company was admittedly inspired by similar managerial trends amongst their largest competitors, the greatest motivation came from the tensions that arose between management and the technicians.
It took some time for us (the management) to learn that registering the technicians so closely was not the same as leading them. Beyond that, we realised that the best knowledge about how to do their jobs was out in the field, not in this office. ' [Service Director] This claim was supported by the Service Department's second-in-command:
The BPM allows us to track productivity. We can see who is and is not performing up to par. Unfortunately, we are poorly positioned to help them perform better.' [Vice-director, Service] Yet the overall reasoning was tempered with the common sense demanded by its marketplace:
You cannot achieve the adaptability levels we need without satisfied employees. If employees are to become satisfied, they must be involved and consulted. This also works to resolve the tensions and frustrations associated with change. ' [Service Director] Experience with total quality management had matured management's understanding of how challenging the task of motivating employees can be. Telling them they are empowered is simply insufficient. Management soon became convinced that the service division needed to be transformed from 150 individual technicians into 20 well-synchronized teams. Thus the traditional structure, which contained five levels in the chain of command, was de-layered to a three-tiered team-based structure: l one management team; l four spokesperson teams; l 20 technician teams.
Each technician team consists of 5±8 technicians including one spokesperson. The key to understanding the function of the team is that the spokesperson is a technician, not chosen by management, but chosen by the team to represent its interests. The spokesperson maintains his/her role as an ordinary technician and fulfils the responsibilities of a spokesperson in addition to normal duties. After the reorganization, the technician team became the primary operating unit of the service division. Planning, goal setting and performance evaluation were henceforth conducted at the team level and it is the spokesperson's responsibility to coordinate the activities of the team in an effort to fulfil performance goals.
This team structure continues up the hierarchy, such that 5±8 spokespersons form a spokesperson team. Each spokesperson team nominates a member of the management team, which maintains collective responsibility for the entire region.
The major goals of this structure are to:
l increase the overall responsiveness of the service team by shortening the chain of command; l improve the overall coordination and synergy effects resulting from team structures, and l increase the degree of`experience sharing', learning and lateral information flows within and between teams.
The project commenced with a business psychologist who conducted two-day courses in team building. Frequent team meetings were initiated to increase the experience sharing and interaction among the members.
Budgeting and control
The final ingredient in the transformation of Bruhn's organization was in the manner in which the company conducted planning and control activities. Acknowledging that technicians confronting customers have the most relevant knowledge of local business dynamics, the challenge was to bring the perspectives of management and line employees closer together. This is achieved if:
l information ownership becomes collective Ð both management and line employees have equal ownership rights to business information, and l planning and analysis functions are transferred to those who have direct contact with operations and customers (Applegate, 1995) .
These ideas form the framework for the interactive control mechanism established in Bruhn. The fundamental issue is that ownership of the planning and analysis functions is shifted from management to the line employees. In the case of Bruhn, it is the task of each technician team to define areas that need attention, and thereafter develop an operational plan for the resolution of the problems, for example in response to a negative trend in the BPM system. Planning and goal setting become the property of each technician team. Conversely, it is the challenge of management to listen to the technician teams and to provide and coordinate resources in support of the teams. On a more strategic level, management's task is to define long-term strategic goals of the firm as well as to establish the outer boundary system within which the empowered employees can operate (Simons, 1995) .
Results
Quantifying the effects of IT investment or management initiatives such as empowerment is always extremely problematic. However, management has made the following estimation: in 1993, the service function worked a total of 156 000 hours in the field. The budget (under the same assumptions with no change in productivity programmes) for 1996 totalled 222 300 hours. This represents a growth of 42% over a three-year period. With the combined effect of the BPM, the budget for 1996 equalled 181 000 hours, a 16% growth over three years. This represents total productivity savings of 26%, or an annual cost reduction of & 8%.
Evaluating the other goals of the empowerment initiatives is even more difficult in financial terms. As mentioned, Bruhn had the direct challenge of returning the technicians' loyalty to the company as well as a corresponding increase in employee satisfaction. The most valid evidence we found to support this argument can be seen in the substantial increase in the biannual employee satisfaction surveys. Moreover, in our own interviews with the technicians, they strongly attested to the improved`spirit' and motivation level of the technician teams.
A N A L Y S I S
Re-examining the Bruhn case we ask`What is the relationship between information technology and formal hierarchy'? Frequently, information systems theorists argue that IT causes Ð or at least permits Ð the reduction of organizational hierarchy. In this instance we can make no such claim. The system could have plausibly functioned in either case. What we can argue is that significant improvements from the BPM system alone were not evident until combined with a dramatic change in the organization and information logistics.
Knowledge dispersion and contractual incompleteness
In conceptualizing the technicians as owners of`knowledge-based assets', we return to Brynjolfsson's derivative of incomplete contracting theory to focus upon issues of incentives and agency costs (Brynjolfsson, 1994) . One important consequence of this framework is that the optimal incentive structure exists where informed agents are in ownership of the physical assets. This is the formal result of the Grossman, Hart and Moore framework, which states that incentive structures will be optimized when complementary assets are owned by the same agent (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) .
Bruhn's management has in fact made the acknowledgement that the technicians have become the`informed agents', through experience, and possess`knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place' (Hayek, 1945, p. 524) Ð or the knowledge which is the natural byproduct of their productive activity. However, this vast experience base has the particular characteristic that the knowledge is highly inalienable, e.g. difficult to transfer from one agent to another, or from agent to principle. As we have argued, this type of knowledge is almost by definition difficult to transfer without significant loss of context, relevance and response time. And although the physical assets are in fact alienable, ownership of these assets by the informed agents is infeasible, insofar as the technicians are not permitted to acquire legal ownership of the company. We therefore conclude that there is a substantial separation between the physical asset owners and the informed agents. Not only are the threats of agency costs significant, but incentive misalignment is also manifested in a classical hold-up problem, where technicians own the specific knowledge asset required for the company's operations.
Although it is conceivably possible to transfer specific information from the line back to the head office, there are several immediate transfer costs. First, as manifested by the BPM system, the information loses context and relevance for making local decisions. As management attests to the BPM system's ability to register activity, they also confide that the data transferred through the system does not better position them to support the technicians on the line. If it did, a considerable`temporal' cost would remain Ð it is completely implausible to use the BPM system to direct the technicians' activity because of the limited response time demanded of their function.
The threat of incentive misalignment is further accelerated through the physical placement of the technicians. The geographical dispersion of the technician's activity, combined with market expectations that the service function should accommodate all problems`on-site', routine as well as unforeseen, stipulates a high level of uncontracted actions in the position. In other words, the proportion of activities residing in the realm of contractual incompleteness is high. To restate this logic in other terms, we argue that market pressures demand rapid response, onsite, with the accommodation of all contingencies and uncertainties in service tasks. This can only be fulfilled through an organization with a high level of contractual incompleteness. This portrays a marked contrast to the traditional Taylorist recipe of industrial activity, where job responsibilities are specific, visual supervision high and uncontracted actions minimized.
Incentive misalignment and resolution
Where the misalignment of incentive structures cannot be resolved through complete contracting, the potential for opportunistic behaviour increases. Critical to the interpretation of this case is understanding the organizational transformation as a set of compensating measures to offset the tendency for self-interested conduct. As previously mentioned, the theory permits consideration of both formal as well as informal mechanisms for mitigating agency costs.
Informal mechanisms for assuaging opportunist behaviour include cultural norms and company spirit, as well as other forms of implicit social sanctioning. This argument is viably applied to the technician teams, claiming that the team structure serves as a prolific venue for repetition, reputation and peer review, thereby replacing formal governance mechanisms with an implicit, yet powerful, control structure.
However, a more formal lever of`goal realignment' can be found in the transfer of the analysis and planning functions from management to the technician teams. By shifting this responsibility over to the individual technician team, we see a`formal' realignment of managerial and employee perspectives. In the interactive control structure, we see that both the management and technicians are focused upon the same outcomes. This paints a contrast to traditional industrial paradigms, where management was focused on one set of results and employees were governed by procedure-based controls. As reported in the case description, the BPM system is focused on registering results. It offers little procedural guidance. This is further emphasized by the fact that the goals or norms of the BPM system are defined historically at the base of the upper quartile (25 out of 100). This means that the technicians' performance goals are in fact their own, and are not defined by management. Although this is no guarantee of the elimination of opportunism, it does formally align technicians' and management's incentives.
Productive knowledge and incentives
It can be fairly argued that a major weakness of modern economic theories of the firm, such as agency theory, transaction cost theory and incomplete contracts theory, is their overwhelming tendency to reduce all aspects of economic and often social organization to the alignment of incentives. This perspective assumes that productive knowledge simply exists Ð as in a production function Ð implying no problems in the differentiation and coordination of productive knowledge. Consequently, the sole purpose of management is the use of incentives, monitoring and sanctions to assuage opportunism and maximize productivity (Foss, 1997) . However, while attention has been focused on the mis-and realignment of incentives in this case, the issue of the dispersion and redistribution of productive knowledge is also central in the interpretation. Moreover, it is argued that the major contribution of the`information assets' derivative of the GHM theories as an interpretative framework is the acknowledgement that the coordination of productive knowledge is, in fact, imperfect. That is, knowledge can be bounded, inalienable, dispersed, idiosyncratic or`sticky'. Consequently, the framework implicitly highlights the fact that linking sources of productive knowledge within the firm is a problematic combination of incentives, embedded knowledge and information asymmetries.
Hart (Hart, 1995) argues that a major benefit of internal integration is that information is exchanged more readily and that the parties are more willing to cooperate. While some have claimed that the defining property of integration is the elimination of information asymmetries (Arrow, 1975) , a softer form of the argument suggests that reducing information asymmetries can help align incentives, as well as improving the probability for which contractually incomplete behaviour will be efficient for both parties (Hart, 1995) .
This point can be illustrated in the analysis of Bruhn, where it is explicitly argued that the issue of incentive misalignment is a problem of information asymmetries caused by the idiosyncratic nature of the`information assets'. We can therefore interpret the placement of planning and analysis functions in the hands of the technician teams as a clear attempt at reducing information asymmetries. Both management and employees are directly focused on process results and have equal ownership rights to this information. Furthermore, by making the team, as opposed to the individual, the fundamental operating unit of the organization, the technicians' incentives are more equally balanced between rivalry and cooperation. As a catalyst to improving their own performance as a team, they now have the direct incentive to reveal additional information laterally within teams, increasing cooperation. This should result in à learning' effect which would consequently improve the overall performance of the division, while maintaining an adequate level of rivalry, via tournaments, among the individual teams. The increase in lateral information flows further reduces information asymmetries and, hence, will help realign the incentives.
Finally, it must be noted that critics of transaction-based perspectives have denounced the pessimism of contractually based traditions. That is, first-order efficiency maximization deems firms as nothing more than second-best alternatives to the market (Goshal & Moran, 1996) . As a consequence, scholars have sought theories that acknowledge the firm as an entity with its own logic and purpose. This need has, in part, motivated competing theories such as organizational learning and resource/capabilities-based economics, which in broad terms focus upon the acquisition and coordination of productive knowledge within the firm. In light of the large gaps that remain between these competing traditions, we suggest that the`information asset' derivative of incomplete contracting theories, in acknowledging that organization is more than a question of aligning incentives but also a mechanism of coordinating and managing an idiosyncratic, shared knowledge base, takes an important step in closing the gap between transaction and resource/capabilities-based theories, as well as offering a fundamentally new perspective on information systems design within organizations.
C O N C L U S I O N
Bruhn's deployment of a sophisticated internal performance monitoring system met a defensive response among the service technicians. Vast amounts of operating data delivered on individual performance proved to be ineffective, both for management and for the technicians, when used in a traditional hierarchical control context. Only by re-engineering the organizational structure and human resource policies was Bruhn able to leverage the value of the IT system. Specifically, by forming a team-based organization, combined with an effective empowerment programme, the company was able to tap the vast amount of knowledge found in its line employees and nurture the organizational learning. By re-routing this knowledge flow directly to those on the operating lines, management was able to transform its function from a`policer' of data to a supportive role in an interactive control context.
In interpreting this case we have attempted to highlight the governance problems inherent in geographically dispersed, knowledge-based service organizations. In doing so, a derivative of the Grossman, Hart and Moore theory of incomplete contracting was utilized to delineate the incentive misalignments resulting from separation of informed agents (technicians) and principles of the physical assets. It is argued that the success of the organizational change is due, in part, to the realignment of incentive structures among owners and informed agents, alleviating the opportunistic behaviour which can increase in contractually incomplete settings. It is further argued that the restructuring of the organization not only mitigated incentive misalignment but also had fundamental consequences for the redistribution and coordination of productive knowledge within the firm.
By allowing for the separation of physical and information-based assets we are able to model the incentive problems which arise from the dispersion of productive knowledge, as well as issues concerning its coordination and management. This particular dimension brings a framework firmly rooted in transaction theory one step closer to competing paradigms such as organizational learning and resource-based theories.
